




Conjunctions in the Source Texts (ST) and Target Texts (TT) 
 
 ST TT 
T1 1. Five years ago (Temp) 
2. Or (Add) 
3. This time (Temp) 
4. No doubt (Cont) 
 
 
1. 若是 (H) 
2. 五年前 (Temp) 
3. 不管 (H) 
4. 那时 (Temp) 
5. 并 (Add) 
6. 而 (Add) 
7. 不过 (Adv) 
8. 这一次 (Temp) 
 
T2 1. Certainly (C) 
2. For example (A) 
3. And (Adv) 
4. However (Adv) 
5. Similarly (A) 
6. In short (Temp) 
7. However (Adv) 
8. finally (Temp) 
9. Because (Cau) 
 
 
1. 当然 (Cont) 
2. 当然 (Cont) 
3. 更 (moreover) (Add) 
4. 不过 (Adv) 
5. 同样的 (Add) 
6. 简而言之 (Temp) 
7. 不过 (Adv) 
8. 终于 (Temp) 
9. 还是 (Adv) 
10. 因为(Cau) 
11. 如果 (H) 
 
T3 1. Secondly (Temp) 
2. Furthermore (Add) 
3. As such (Cau) 
4. and (Add) 
5. Interestingly (Cau) 
6. As a result (Cau) 
7. And  (Add) 
8. perhaps (Cont) 
 
 
1. 第二 (Temp) 
2. 因此 (Cau) 
3. 另外 (Add) 
4. 却(instead) (Adv) 
5. 因此 (Cau) 
6. 如此一来 (Cau) 
7. 值得玩味的是 (Cont) 
8. 因为(Cau) 
9. 不但…也 (Adv) 




 ST TT 
   
11. 而 (Add) 
12. 也许 (Cont) 
 
T4 1. Thirdly (Temp) 
2. and (Add) 
3. because (Cau) 
 
1. 第三 (Temp) 
2. 因此 (Cau) 





4. 由于…因此 (Cau) 
 
T5 1. Because (Cau) 
2. Firstly (Temp) 
3. As such (Cau) 
4. Secondly (Temp) 
5. As such (Cau) 
6. In short (Temp) 
7. unless(H) 
8. However (Adv) 
9. As such (Cau) 
10. However (Adv) 
11. And (Add) 
 
1. 因为 (Cau) 
2. 首先 (Temp) 
3. 因此 (Cau) 
4. 因为 (Cau) 
5. 再者 (Add) 
6. 简而言之 (Temp) 
7. 除非 (H) 
8. 然而 (Adv) 
9. 如果 (H) 
10. 不过 (Adv) 
 
T6 1. Only (Adv) 
2. Meanwhile (Temp) 
3. Interestingly (Cont) 
 
 
1. 简单地说 (Temp) 
2. 而(ADVER) (Adv) 
3. 因 (Cau) 
4. 然后 (Temp) 
5. 却 (Adv) 
6. 因此 (Cau) 
7. 因为 (Cau) 
8. 有趣的是 (Cont) 
T7 1. Firstly (Temp) 
2. Obviously (Cont) 
3. effectively (Cont)  
4. Or rather (Adv) 
 
1. 首先 (Temp) 
2. 显而易见的是 (Cont) 





 ST TT 
T8 1. But (Adv) 
2. Suddenly (Cont) 
3. If (h) 
4. finally (Temp) 
 
 
1. 但是 (Adv) 
2. 也 (Add) 
3. 因此 (Cau) 
4. 而(yet) (Adv) 
5. 如果 (H) 
6. 而且 (Add) 
 
T9 1. However (Adv) 
2. well (Cont) 
3. So (Cau) 
4. Firstly (Temp) 
5. Because (Cau) 
6. Secondly (Temp) 
7. If (H) 
8. Then (Cau) 
9. Thirdly (Temp) 
10. And (Add) 
11. Fourthly (Temp) 
12. and (Add) 
 
1. 据我所知 (Cont) 
2. 也 (and) (Add) 
3. 但是 (Adv) 
4. 然后 (Temp) 
5. 而且(and) (Add) 
6. 以及 (Add) 
7. 首先 (Temp) 
8. 再者 (Add) 
9. 如果…那么 (H) 
10. 三者 (Temp) 
11. 四者 (Temp) 
12. 事实上 (Adv) 
13. 尤其 (Add) 
14. 以及 (Add) 
 
T10 1. Certainly (Cont) 
2. However (Adv) 
3. On the one hand (Add) 
4. And (Add) 
5. on the other (Add) 
6. Still (Adv) 
7. On the other hand (Add) 
8. Certainly (Cont) 
9. However (Adv) 
10. whilst (Adv) 
 
 
1. 当然 (Cont) 
2. 然而 (Cont) 
3. 同时 (Temp) 
4. 另一方面 (Add) 
5. 当然 (Cont) 
6. 不过 (Adv) 
7. 因为 (Cau) 





 ST TT 
T11 1. At the same time (Temp) 
2. For example (Add) 
 
 
1. 同时 (Temp) 
2. 比方说 (Add) 
3. 但 (Adv) 
4. 并 (Add) 
 
T12 1. Secondly (Temp) 
2. Despite (Adv) 
3. and (Add) 
4. whilst (Adv) 
5. If (H) 
6. Only (Adv) 
7. Because (Cau) 
8. Similarly (Add) 
 
1. 再者 (Add) 
2. 尽管 (Adv) 
3. 然而 (Adv) 
4. 因为(Cau) 
5. 而 (Adv) 
6. 而 (Adv) 
7. 以及 (Add) 
8. 因此 (Adv) 
9. 而 (Adv) 
 
T13 1. As a result (Cau) 
2. And (Adv） 
3. in this respect (Cau) 
 
 
1. 因此 (Adv) 
2. 至少 (Adv) 
3. 而 (and) (Add) 
4. 在这一方面 (Add) 
 
T14 1. Of course (Cont) 
2. However (Adv) 
3. and (Add) 
4. Nonetheless (Adv) 
 
 
1. 第四点 (T) 
2. 当然 (Cont) 
3. 只是 (Adv) 
4. 如今 (Cont) 
5. 不管怎样 (Cont) 
6. 而 (add) (Add) 
7. 而且 (Adv) 
8. 但是 (Adv) 
 
T15 1. and (Add) 
2. and (Add) 
3. increasingly (Cont) 
4. but (Adv) 
 
 
1. 实际上( in reality) (Adv) 
2. 毫无疑问的 (Cont) 
3. 而 (and) (Add) 





 ST TT 
T16 1. At the time (Temp) 
2. Nonetheless (Adv) 
3. for (Cau) 
 
1. 那时 (Temp) 
2. 以及 (Add) 
3. 因 (Cau) 
4. 而 (Cau) 
5. 再加上 (Add) 
6. 然而 (Adv) 
7. 因 (Cau) 
 
T17 1. Maybe (Cont) 
2. However (Adv) 
3. And (Add) 
4. Rather than (Adv) 
5. Firstly (Temp) 
6. Frankly (Cont) 
7. If (H) 
8. However (Adv) 
9. in essence (Cont) 
10. Whereas (Adv) 
11. but (Adv) 
1. 或许 (maybe) (Cont) 
2. 只是 (Adv) 
3. 因为(Cau) 
4. 但 (Adv) 
5. 虽…可是却 (though…but) 
(Adv) 
6. 然而 (however) (Adv) 
7. 却 (Adv) 
8. 首先 (Temp) 
9. 坦白说 (Cont) 
10. 如果 (H) 
11. 但是 (Adv) 
12. 简单来说 (Cont) 
13. 但是 (Adv) 
14. 尽管 (Adv) 
15. 可 (Adv) 
 
T18 1. however (Adv) 
2. Needless to say (Cont) 
 
 
1. 就算…也 (H) 
2. 如果 (H) 
3. 在本质上 (Cont) 
4. 不用说 (Cont) 





 ST TT 
T19 1. The first (Temp) 
2. Nonetheless (Adv) 
3. Firstly (Temp) 
4. Secondly (Temp) 
5. And (Add) 
6. Thirdly (Temp) 
7. Certainly (Cont) 
8. For example (Add) 
9. Interestingly (Cont) 
 
 
1. 首先 (Temp) 
2. 可是 (Adv) 
3. 不过 (Adv) 
4. 首先 (Temp) 
5. 再者 (Add) 
6. 三者 (T) 
7. 比如 (Add) 
8. 有意思的是 (Cont) 
 
T20 1. However (Adv) 
2. However (Adv) 
3. And (Add) 
4. Moreover (Add) 
5. Clearly (Cont) 
6. By way of comparison (Adv) 
7. and (Add) 
 
 
1. 只是 (adv) 
2. 然而 (Adv) 
3. 而 (add) 
4. 以致 (as a result) (Cau) 
5. 再者(moreover) (Add) 
6. 而(and) (Add) 
7. 显然的 (clearly) (Cont) 
8. 相较之下(by way of 
comparison) (Add) 
9. 不过 (Adv) 
10. 因为 (Cau) 
 
T21 1. Or (Add) 
2. If (H) 
3. Then (Cau) 
4. and (Add) 
5. Today (Temp) 
6. Tomorrow (Temp) 
7. And (Add) 
8. The day after (Temp) 
9. If (H) 
10. sadly (Cont) 
 
 
1. 抑或 (Add) 
2. 举个例子 (Add) 
3. 事实上 (Adv) 
4. 而 (Adv) 
5. 如果.,..那么 (H) 
6. 并 (Add) 
7. 今天 (Temp) 
8. 明天 (Temp) 
9. 再莱 (Add) 
10. 如果 (H) 









1. 却是 (Adv) 
2. 但是 (Adv) 
 
T23 1. In short (Temp) 
2. Moreover (Add) 
3. Instead (Adv) 
4. Furthermore (Add) 
 
 
1. 简单地说 (Temp) 
2. 再者 (Add) 
3. 相反的 (Add) 
4. 不过 (Adv) 
 
T24 1. In essence (Cont) 
2. In this respect (Cau) 
3. in the past (Temp) 
4. and even (Add) 
 
 
1. 但 (Adv) 
2. 简单地说 (Temp) 
3. 在这一方面 (Cau) 
4. 过去 (Temp) 
5. 甚至 (Add) 
 
T25 1. In addition (Add) 
2. Firstly (Temp) 
3. Secondly (Temp) 
4. And (Add) 
5. Thirdly (Temp) 
6. If (H) 
 
1. 因为(Cau) 
2. 现在 (Cont) 
3. 其实 (Adv) 
4. 也 (Add) 
5. 因为(and because) (Cau) 
6. 不过 (Adv) 
7. 首先 (Temp) 
8. 再者 (Add) 
9. 三者 (Temp) 
10. 如果 (H) 
 
T26 1. And (Add) 
2. Moreover (Add) 
3. Despite (Adv) 
4. Still (Adv) 
 
1. 而(and) (Add) 
2. 但是 (Adv) 
 
T27 1. Although (Adv) 
2. Yet (Adv) 
3. Firstly (Temp) 
4. Secondly (Temp) 
5. Thirdly (Temp) 
6. Similarly (Add) 
7. So (Cau) 
8. essentially (Cont) 
9. If (H) 
1. 虽然。。。但是 (Adv) 
2. 但是 (Adv) 
3. 首先 (Temp) 
4. 同时 (Temp) 
5. 再者 (Add) 
6. 第三 (Tem 
 




7. 同样的 (Add) 
8. 再说 (besides) (Add) 
9. 同时 (Temp) 
10. 最主要的是 (Cont) 




T28 1. Essentially (Cont) 
2. If (H) 
3. As a consequence (Cau) 
4. By way of comparison (Adv) 
5. at the time (Temp) 
 
1. 最主要的是 (Cont) 
2. 如果…那么 (H) 
3. 因此 (Cau) 
4. 相较之下 (Add) 
 
T29 1. And (Add) 
2. Furthermore (Add) 
3. In fact (Adv) 
4. yes (Cont) 
 
 
1. 而 (Add) 
2. 因为 (Cau) 
3. 而(Cau) 
4. 另外 (Add) 
5. 还有 (Add) 
6. 事实上 (Adv) 


















MODERATE MUSLIMS MUST SPEAK UP 
The Business Times Singapore, October 13, 2001 
Sin Chew Jit Poh, October 14, 2001 
The Sun, October 21, 2001 
 
Malaysia will be a key player in the eventual resolution of the events that have spiraled 
out of the ‗9/11‘ assault on the World Trade Center. I know this might sound ridiculous given 
the fact that all the present action – the bombings and the diplomatic salvos – are concentrated 
in the United States, Europe, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other parts of the Middle East. 
  
It is becoming increasingly clear that the real conflict sparked off by the attacks concerns 
the world of ideas. There is a desperate need for the Islamic world to reinvent itself. Moderate 
Muslims must head off the civilisational clash and prevent the narrow-minded and bigoted 
practitioners of the faith from forcing believers in becoming more regressive and backward. 
  
Malaysia has long been in the vanguard of practical and pragmatic Islamic thinking. 
When the time comes for the leaders of the Islamic world to address the issues of socio-
economic development, civil society and modernity from an Islamic perspective, they will have 
to come to Malaysia. 
  
In centuries to come, twenty-first century Kuala Lumpur will be cited alongside Spain‘s 
Cordoba and Harun al-Rashid‘s Baghdad as one of the great centers of Islamic world. It is for 
this reason that our friends in the west should be a deal more circumspect in their handling of 
Malaysia. The Malaysian model of Islam and modernity is a vital civilisational resource. 
  
In addition, it should be remembered that the groups who planned the assault on the 
World Trade Center had three key objectives: firstly, to terrorize the American population; 
secondly, to polarize the world and divide Muslims for non-Muslims; and thirdly, to undermine 
moderate Islamic governments. 
  
The second and third objectives are clearly aimed at countries such as Malaysia as well as 
the United States. The Kuala Lumpur that I know and love is as imperiled by events as 
Washington D.C. and New York. If Malaysians are not vigilant the attackers will also be able to 
undermine our prosperity and stability. One only has to observe the speed with which Indonesia 
– a remarkably moderate Islamic polity – is buckling under th onslaught of Islamic extremism, 
to grasp the potency of the threat. 
  
Firstly, Americans no longer feel safe and secure in ‗Fortress America‘. Everyday life – 
waking up in the morning, commuting to office and switching on the computer – has become a 
series of potentially lethal acts. 
  
Obviously I can‘t offer any solution to this multi-faceted threat except to observe that the 
‗9/11‘ attacks were a coming of age for the United States. Effectively, the American people 
have been put on notice: their actions – or rather the actions of their leaders – will have serious 
ramifications on their lives, and isolationism is self-defeating. An ostrich is no less vulnerable 
when it buries its head in the sand. 
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Secondly, the television barrages me with images of anger and frustration. I am 
confronted by images of Muslims protesting in the streets, their faces contorted with venom and 
fury. Day by day the list of countries where the demonstrations are taking place grows longer: 
Philippines, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia and now, even in Malaysia. 
  
Of course, television is a superficial medium. It is stark, simplistic and unsubtle. It does 
not record the gradations of human experience so much as exaggerate the peaks and troughs, 
ignoring the commonplace. News footage is seldom representative of the reality on the ground. 
Television cameras thrive on certain level of emotional intensity – focusing on moments of 
anger, suffering and tragedy. On TV, Pakistan, a nation of over 130 million people, is merely a 
stage for Islamic clerics and hotheads to rally in the streets, chant slogans and burn American 
flags. 
  
However, the proliferation of such images damages Islam, drawing the outside world‘s 
attention to the ugliest and most extreme face of the faith. These images separate us from the 
global community. Under television‘s ugly glare, 1.2 billion Muslims from diverse cultural and 
socio-economic backgrounds are reduced to little more than an angry, violent and irrational mob 
on the margins of civilizations. This is a fact of life; it is unfair but true. 
  
Whilst there is very little that Malaysians can do to bolster America‘s internal security, 
we are one of the very few nations that can possibly address the second and third objectives – 
essentially the civilisational issues. We have a role to play on the global level that far exceeds 
our international projection and this role is predicated by our achievements to date. 
  
Malaysia stands out amongst the rogue gallery of the Organization of Islamic Conference 
(OIC). We are a multi-racial democracy that tolerates religious diversity. Moreover, we have 
been enormously successful in economic terms – ploughing back the fruits of our endeavours 
into education, health care and alleviating rural poverty. That‘s the good news. 
  
The bad news is that we have failed to address the civil society agenda head-on. The 
Anwar Ibrahim debacle is a testament to that weakness. Despite our manifest flaws, we are – 
with the sole exception of an embattled Indonesia, a crisis-prone Bangladesh and a shaky 
Turkey – the only prosperous democracy in the Islamic world. Still, we are the model Islamic 
nation for the twenty-first century. 
  
Of course, television cameras are rarely interested in recording the millions of contented 
middle-class Malaysian Muslims happily going about their lives as doctors, engineers and 
managers. In television terms, they are irrelevant and unexciting when set against the image of a 
fist punching the air and the cry of ‗Allahuakbar!‖ Moderation and forbearance don‘t constitute 
‗good‘ television. Who wants to see people who are not demonstrating or rioting? Certainly not 
CNN, CNBC or the BBC. 
  
Malaysians must show the world (both the Muslim and the non-Muslim nations) that the 
so-called civilisational clash can be avoided and how. Our political leaders must show fortitude 
and restraint. Fadzil Noor‘s flag burning is exactly the type of act that we should condemn. 
  
But what can ordinary Malaysians do? 
 
 Civil society organizations, professional associations (such as the Bar Council) and 
networking groups (Rotarians, Lions, YPOs, YEOs) should arrange inter-faith meetings and 
dialogues as well as memorial services for the civiliam victions of the ‗9/11‘ tragedy and the 
American bombing in Afghanistan. Both sets of victims are innocent. The act of joining 
together to commemorate the losses would signify and strengthen our multi-religious character. 
We must show through example that dialogue and interaction foster greater mutual 
understanding and not distrust. 
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Moderate voices must speak up. Now is not the time to disagree quietly with extremism 
or intolerance. Furthermore, we must attract the attention of the world‘s media in an intelligent 
manner. We are carrying on our shoulders the good name of the faith. In time to come the 
margins of Islam will reinvent and renew the faith. If we are courageous and determined, our 
pragmatic religious practices will become the reality for the entire Islamic world. 
 
THE MALAYSIAN CHINESE MOOD 
 
The Business Times Singapore, March 3, 2001 
 
The Sun, March 4, 2001 
 
Although the next general election is over three years away and the MCA‘s internal party 
polls only kick off next year (2002), the political temperature within the Chinese community is 
climbing. At first glance, there would appear to be no reason for all the activity. Yet tension is 
palpable. 
 
Firstly, there is the former DAP Penang Chairman Teoh Teik Huat‘s hotly contested 
application to join Keadilan as well as Lime Kit Siang‘s disquiet over his supposed ally‘s long-
term intentions. Secondly, a mind-numbingly tedious power struggle within the MCA (yawn). 
Thirdly, there is mounting concern over the future of Chinese-language education. The 
continuing worries over the Vision School initiative and the recent demonstrations over the 
relocation of a Chinese vernacular school in Petaling Jaya have reinforced the Chinese 
community‘s doubts over the government‘s intentions. 
 
 Similarly, last year‘s Suqui controversy underlines the over-whelming importance of 
issues such as language, culture and education to the Chinese community. What is noteworthy is 
the community‘s growing assertiveness, not to mention the apparent willingness of the Malay 
opposition parties to encourage these demands. 
 
 So what does all this activity amount to? Essentially the political class – especially after 
Keadilan‘s victory in the Lunas by-election – has realized the importance of the Chinese vote. If 
the ‗Lunas effect‘ were to be replicated across the nation in 2004, the Alternative Front would 
be swept into government. 
 
 As a consequence, the opposition parties accelerated their attempts to woo the 
community, competing for the Chinese vote in a bold and enterprising fashion. I would argue 
that PAS and Keadilan‘s outreach programmes have left UMNO far behind. By way of 
comparison, the leading Malay party is locked in the past. PAS‘s gestures in Kelantan and 
Terengganu, where land has been offered to Chinese language schools, are causing considerable 
waves within the community. 
 
 A good example of PAS‘s willingness to win support from the Chinese community can 
be seen in Dr Hatta Ramli‘s (party president Datuk Fadzil Noor‘s political secretary) 
outspokenness at the height of the Suqui controversy back in August 2000. At the time he said, 
―Let the Umno Malays be warned, they would have to step over the dead bodies of the 
Alternative Front Malays before they can harm the Chinese.‖ 
 
 As the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Chinese community grows, it is 
important to note the four main reasons for this dramatic change as well as the key underlying 
theme that has to be addressed by those seeking to win (or retain) the hotly contested votes. 
 
 The first and most obvious reason for the altered situation is the disarray within the 
Malay community. However, as I‘ve argued time and again, this disunity is a permanent feature 
of Malay politics. The uneven implementation of the NEP has resulted in the creation of 
different classes of Malays. Moreover, many of these classes have discovered that their 
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unhappiness with government of policies (ranging from privatization through to judicial reform) 
are shared by the non-Malays. This is extremely important because it is shows that the fault 
lines in Malaysian politics are no longer merely racial. 
 
 Secondly, the Anwar Ibrahim debacle provided an opportunity for many new players 
(ambitious men and women) to enter politics. This younger generation are predominantly in 
their thirties. They – men like Tian Chua – are unencumbered by the trauma of 1969 and are 
willing to test the limits of government tolerance. Furthermore, they are fired on by the injustice 
of a system of positive discrimination that has excluded them, their friends and their families 
from government jobs, universities and contracts. As such, and often with the support of the 
Malay opposition parties, they are confident enough to challenge the NEP and its 
implementation. 
 
 Interestingly many of these players (men such as Suqui‘s general secretary Ser Choon 
Ing), have entered public life only after years of experience in the realm of NGO activism. The 
apprenticeship in the NGO world (especially with Chinese language associations) have been 
invaluable. As a result, they have a large network, community-wide credibility and the ability to 
articulate ideas as well as the organizational skills to mobilize people. 
 
 It should not be forgotten that many Gerakan leaders such as Tan Sri Koh Tsu Koon 
also rose to prominence through this route, and that the identification with Chinese language 
rights is a guaranteed means to turbo-charging a career in politics. Perhaps the Barisan 
Nasional‘s Chinese-dominated parties need an infusion of fresh blood from the NGO world as 
well? 
 
 Thirdly, many from the thirty-something generation are frustrated with the poverty of 
talent in the upper echelons of Chinese political life (this includes the DAP). Many feel that the 
lack of change at the top hamper efforts to reform, and weak leadership has left the community 
poorly represented. A good example is the MCA‘s inability to win over its core constituency to 
the Vision Schools. The party‘s lack of credibility resulted in the near universal rejection of the 
programme. Because of their distrust of the government, the Chinese community essentially 
turned its back on an attempt to reform a system of educational apartheid. 
 
 Furthermore, it‘s arguable that the insistence on sticking to racially exclusive parties has 
limited the community‘s impact on a national level. Keadilan‘s multi-racial posture has attracted 
the younger generation who are enamoured by its new orientation and vision. However, it 
remains to be seen whether or not Keadilan‘s rhetoric will be continued if and when Anwar 
Ibrahim emerges from jail. 
 
 The fourth reason is the rise of China as a world power. It shouldn‘t be forgotten that 
the NEP was hatched and implemented at a time (the 1970s) when China was still recovering 
from the madness of the Cultural Revolution. By way of comparison, China is now Asia‘s sole 
superpower. The country‘s ability to withstand the Asian financial crisis, not to mention its 
courage in standing up to perceived American bullying are indicators of its global stature. With 
Ang Lee‘s movie, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, bursting into international popular culture, 
China has also become a global cultural-cum-entertainment power. These factors have a deep 
impact on the identity and self-worth of the Chinese, prompting a more upfront and aggressive 
approach from its interlocutors. 
 
 However, the underlying theme in Malaysian politics and a critical factor in 
understanding changes in the Chinese community is the realignment of the national political 
agenda. Politics is no longer racially exclusive. Class – socio-economic class – is beginning to 
play a major role, and this gives issue-driven politics a higher profile. This has meant that the 
lower income groups are able to reach across the racial divide and establish working alliances 
based on shared interests and objectives. 
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 Furthermore, the perceived humility and integrity of PAS leaders and the relative 
absence of corruption in Kelantan and Terengganu has been well received by many Chinese 
businessmen, most of whom are repulsed by what they see as UMNO‘s rapacity and 
incompetence. In fact, one could go so far as to say that the small town. Chinese-educated class 
share certain conservative – yes, even ‗Asian‘ values, with their brethren in PAS. 
 
 The transformation of the political landscape requires a positive response from Barisan 
Nasional. In many ways, UMNO, with its history of multi-racial accommodation, should be the 






Sin Chiew Jit Poh, February 24, 2002 
 
The Star, February 24, 2002 
 
The Business Times Singapore, February 26, 2002 
 
The Persatuan Ulama Malaysia  (PUM) recently submitted a memorandum to the 
Chairman of the Council of Rulers against two newspaper columnists and three other 
individuals whom they claimed had denigrated Islam. Amongst those cited by the PUM in their 
memorandum were Sisters in Islam executive director Zainah Anwar, academic and columnist 
Farish A. Noor, Universiti Malaya lecturer Patricia Martinez, The Sun columnist Akbar Ali and 
Malay intellectual Kassim Ahmad. Along with six other Islamic organizations, PUM argued in 
their memorandum that the individuals cited had disparaged the faith and the institution of 
ulama. 
 
 The memorandum has attracted considerably publicity and was covered extensively by 
the local media. However I suspect most Malaysians would have read the news, yawned and 
then turned over the page: a squabble between a bunch of writers and the ulama? Who cares? 
 
 Well they‘re wrong – very wrong. The face-off between PUM and the six individuals in 
an extremely important test for Malaysia and for the practice of Islam in Malaysia. It will have a 
major impact on how Malaysia copes with the issue of religious extremism, the position and 
orientation of the ulama as well as the overarching question of democracy within Islamic 
discourse. So why is this issue so important for Malaysia? 
 
 There are four reasons why: firstly, because Malaysia is a majority Muslim nation, 
Islamic practices will have a significant impact on the entire nation; secondly, if it is accepted 
that Malaysia‘s governance and administration should be based on Islamic principles, then the 
interpretation and implementation of those principles should be debated and widely considered; 
thirdly, that this discourse should not be limited to a small section of the population; and 
fourthly, that we are embarking on an extremely exciting – and let‘s face it – potentially bumpy 
ride as we endeavour to meld the virtues of democracy, good governance and modernity with 
the timeless principles elucidated in the Holy Koran. 
 
 What we are doing in Malaysia has not really been attempted elsewhere in the Islamic 
world. We are entrusted with an enormous burden. Given the incompetence, corruption and 
injustice in much of the Arab Muslim world, our model of Islamic practices, moderation, 
minority rights, development and social justice will become increasingly valuable for the entire 
globe. This means that we shouldn‘t rush things or deny space to serious and reasonable voices 
from outside the ulama. 
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 As I said, everyone should be concerned with this issue – Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike, because Islam (unlike modern-day Christianity) cannot be relegated to the private and 
personal domain. Islam embraces all aspects of our lives. 
 
 Moreover, contrary to what many people think – the Islamic world is not monolithic. 
There is a great deal of diversity in how people practice the faith. Believe me. During my time 
in the States, I have been meeting with Muslims from all over the globe – from Egypt, Iran, 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Morocco. Whilst we all share the same faith, our 
expression of that faith varies and our cultural practices matter in this respect. In fact, Islam both 
recognizes and celebrates freedom of expression. Moreover, there is a long-established tradition 
of ikhtilaf (difference of opinion) within Islam that actually seeks to acknowledge and respect 
these differences of opinion within a framework that is accommodating and moderate. 
 
 The confrontation between the PUM and the writers is concerned with the all-important 
question of who controls the interpretation of the Holy Koran. Should one set of people – the 
ulamas in PUM – monopolize the right to interpret the Holy Koran? Should we submit to their 
views alone or should we encourage a diversity of views? What about the ulamas not 
represented in PUM for example? What about the man on the street? 
 
 The central issue is not faith, it‘s power: pure and simple. If you accept that Islam 
infuses guides and subsumes all aspects of our lives, then the interpreters of the Holy Koran are 
very powerful people. They can shape our lives, determining the rights and position of men and 
women respectively, and decide on matters of public policy. Drawing their authority from the 
Holy Koran, they can pontificate on any and all aspects of our lives. Today, six writers are 
under attack. Tomorrow it could be entertainers such as Ella, Erra Fazira and Siti Nor Haliza, 
and the day after it could well be women who chose to work. 
 
 If we – the ordinary people – elect not to support the writers we are in effect saying that 
we don‘t want to have a ‗say‘ in these all important matters, that we want the ulamas to be all-
powerful. Sadly, most Malaysians and especially the middle classes of all races are extremely 
apathetic. After years of being brow-beaten by Dr Mahathir, they are used to letting others make 
decisions for them. This has got to change. 
 
 Interestingly, the fracas has not played out along the traditional political lines. For 
example, the writers have received support from a wide range of groups and individuals 
including NGOs such as ABIM and Just World as well as individuals such as Deputy Prime 
Minister Abdullah Badawi and PRM leader Syed Husin Ali. 
 
 Whilst the two groups and the two men represent diverse political views, all of them 
agree on the need for greater debate and dialogue on Islam. They reject intellectual terrorism. 
As such they have criticized PUM for their attempt to quash the openness of the discourse, 
albeit in differing ways. I should at this point mention the fact that the ulamas themselves are a 
very diverse collection of men and there are many among them who would advocate a far less 
condemnatory and black and white approach to Islamic discourse. They realize that instilling 
fear is counterproductive. 
 
 Unfortunately PAS – a party that subscribes to the view that the ulamas are the supreme 
and unchallengeable interpreters of the Holy Koran – have been the biggest supporters of PUM. 
This is a shame because the issue will end up being little more than a political football with 
UMNO on one side and PAS on the other. 
 
 This does not mean that liberals such as myself want to deny the ulamas the right to 
interpret the Holy Koran. Far from it. Instead we – as representatives of the people, because we 
are your voice – want to share the space. We want to show to the world that Malaysia is 
different from the rest of the Islamic world in that we have the confidence and the substance to 
be able to debate the issues of modernity and faith. We want to win the ulamas in PUM over to 
democracy and ikhtilaf and work together to ensure that our future here in Malaysia avoids the 
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disasters that have bedeviled the many Islamic societies where discourse, tolerance and 





THE MODERN MALAY DILEMMA 
 
The Star, April 28, 2002 
Sin Chew Hit Poh, April 28, 2002 
The Business Times Singapore, April 30, 2002 
Berita Harian, May 6, 2002 
 
The Malay world vision has narrowed drastically in the past five years. This is a national 
tragedy because parochial and pedantic thinking in the corridors of power will destroy the 
Malaysia we know and love. Why? Firstly, the country is multi-racial. As such the Malays – 
who are politically dominant – have to maintain their ability to speak (and listen) across the 
religious divide. Consensus-building is an important part of nation‘s success. Secondly, the 
nation‘s trade is far larger than our GDP. As such, the prosperity we see around us depends on 
an export-driven economy. In short, we cannot maintain our livelihood – the Protons, the 
bungalows and the holidays in Medan and Hong Kong – unless we look outwards. Our horizons 
have to be global. 
 
 However, a succession of missteps culminating with Anwar Ibrahim‘s outster, detention 
and trial has emboldened the forces of religious conservatism. PAS‘s growth might have 
resulted in the heightening of religious and moral issues. As such the political debate has 
focused almost entirely on the battle for moral legitimacy and supremacy, shifting the attention 
inwards rather than outwards. 
 
 In many ways this is understandable. PAS, as a party led by ulamas, has concentrated 
on their core strength: Islam. They have attacked UMNO at the ruling party‘s weakest point – 
its perceived lack of religious credentials. This in turn has raised important questions about the 
efficacy and effectiveness of contemporary liberal democratic institutions such as the judiciary 
and the civil service. PAS poses the question: if corruption is truly endemic, shouldn‘t we be 
replacing the entire western system of governance? However, in their haste to denounce the 
government at every turn. PAS has neglected to present credible economic or diplomatic policy 
initiatives, and failed in essence to address the challenges of modernity. 
 
 Malaysians and especially the Malay community are in danger of becoming obsessed 
with microscopic issues of ritual and doctrine, to the exclusion of all else. Piety is all important. 
Only last week, one friend described the present Malays predicament neatly. He told me about 
two highly-educated Malay colleagues who were obsessed with the issue of the appropriate garb 
for women. He said that these two young men spent hours debating this subject, adding that 
―they seemed to have no interest in other more worldly issues.‖ This ‗closed‘ mentality has had 
a disastrous impact on our public life. 
 
 The nation‘s newspapers are engrossed by bizarre ideas like public flogging. Moral 
crusades against incest and homosexuality predominate as serious national issues are sidelined 
and ignored. Meanwhile, the Malay agenda – the uplifting of the Malay community through 
education, improved health-care and public services – has been forgotten. We spend our time 
praising the Bumiputra tycoons and ignoring the real heroes in society, the care-givers – the 
underpaid nurses and the over-worked teachers. Amidst the hype, young Malay males, for 
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example are being left behind. They are less well-educated and therefore more likely to end up 
unemployed and frustrated. In a twist of social-Darwinism the ‗chosen of the chosen‘ are being 
eclipsed by their sisters and their girlfriends. Interestingly (and worrying) it‘s the same under-
performing Malay males who then take up positions of influence and authority later in life. 
 
 No one seems to be willing to ask why our education system is failing such a large (and 
potentially troublesome) chunk of the population. Why are employers less inclined to hire 
young Malays males? Why are we failing to create a cadre of globalised Malays that matches 
our economic aspirations? Could it be that their inability to speak English and or Mandarin 
makes them unprofitable and less attractive workers? Alternatively, can the government absorb 
the surplus? Are we sitting on a time bomb? 
 
 Similarly, last week when China‘s Vice President Hu Jintao and heir apparent visited 
Kuala Lumpur, most Malaysian just yawned: the KLSE Index was more important for them. 
Very few Malaysian (and Malays in particular) realize the extent to which our export-driven 
prosperity is threatened by China‘s gargantuan economy. If we are not careful our puny 
industries will be overwhelmed. 
 There is no one easy solution for the two challenges I‘ve outlined. However there is an 
underlying theme – that of openness. We cannot address the country‘s weaknesses, domestically 
and internationally, unless and until we try to create a truly global agenda for the Malay 
community. This in turn will help strengthen racial understanding as well as an all-
encompassing Malaysian identity. 
 
 Firstly, the Malay community has got to wake up. Whilst faith is vital, religious 
practices do not prevent us from addressing the challenges of everyday life. We must equip 
ourselves with contemporary knowledge— with science, economics and technology— in order 
to defend our way of life. Economics and business are going to have to be the drivers of this re-
tooling of the Malay mindset. The engagement with China is a good illustration of what I mean 
by retooling. We have to learn about the world‘s most populous nation and create niches for 
ourselves in tourism, educational services, agriculture and natural resources. 
 
 We will need a vast pool of Mandarin-speaking Malaysians in order to achieve this 
goal. We can of course turn to the Malaysian Chinese community and task them with the 
interaction. But that is not a sensible long-term solution. Instead, the Malay community must 
also get involved in what is potentially the world‘s largest marketplace. The Malays must be 
equipped to handle the relationship head-on, globalizing their mindset. 
 
 This brings me back to the disturbing educational record of Malay males. Frankly, our 
national education system does not encourage the Malay community to be sufficiently open to 
other cultures and languages. This resistance to external ideas and influences is prejudicial to 
the community‘s employment prospects and long-term future. If is isn‘t halted now, the 
exclusivity and isolationism will only worsen. 
 
 In order to create ‗global‘ Malays we need to inculcate a more dynamic, forward-
looking ethos. Tragically, the New Economic Policy has hampered this development. As long as 
jobs and other opportunities are controlled by government, the incentive to work and study hard 
is removed. However in the real world, ‗knowledge‘, unlike capital, land and labour, cannot be 
mandated. Openness then also refers to the need to ‗open‘ the community up to the harsh 
realities of globalization. Only exposure to greater competition will make the Malays more 
resilient and competitive. Continuing the present policies encourages mediocrity, laziness and 
stupidity. 
 
 Creativity, independent thinking and risk-taking must also-be encouraged. Diversity 
(racial and religious) has to be underlined. Malay students (as well as all Malaysians, 
irrespective of race) must become trilingual. Language proficiency in English, Malay and 
Chinese has to become a minimum requirement in the national education system. Moreover the 
cultures and philosophies underpinning the respective languages must also be taught. Muslims 
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must learn about Christianity, Buddhism and Confucianism and vice versa. How else to foster 
religious understanding? Young Malay males must be trained to succeed in whatever careers 
they want, wherever they want (including China, Europe and North America). The ‗global‘ 
Malay and the truly Malaysian identity is only a step away. Are we open to change? 
 
 
DR MAHATHIR – TWENTY YEARS ON 
 
The Business Times Singapore, July 14, 2001 
 
The Sun, July 15, 2001 
 
The Straits Times, July 17, 2001 
 
Sin Chew Jit Poh, September 16, 2001 
 
Asiaweek, September 21, 2001 
 
 
Yesterday marked Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad‘s twentieth year in office. After two 
decades as prime minister, the Kedah-born doctor continues to shock and amaze, and often 
simultaneously. The 76 year-old leader has never shied away from controversy. Only last 
month, at the opening of the annual UMNO general assembly, Dr Mahathir presented the 
delegates with yet another vintage performance as he lambasted the Malay community for its 
failings and then derided the opposition. 
 
 In an era when politicians the world over are obsesses with wooing the electorate – with 
spin-doctors and pollsters – Dr Mahathir bucks the trend. Throwing caution to the wind on that 
occasion, Dr Mahathir chose to make a bruising frontal assault on the Malay psyche, outraging 
many in the audience. 
 
 I have observed and written about the Prime Minister for my entire adult life, first 
interviewing him for my university newspaper some eighteen years ago. In that time, I have 
come to realize that, despite his paradoxical nature, the man can be utterly predictable. The key 
to comprehending his mercurial and at times frighteningly aggressive personality lies in 
recognizing the forces that drive the man as well his current priorities. 
 
 But let me begin with what I consider to be the two key aspects of Dr Mahathir‘s 
political persona. The first is the intensity of his passions and the second is his surprising ability 
to compromise – a duality that distinguishes him from anyone else in UMNO politics, with the 
sole exception of Anwar Ibrahim. 
 
 Dr Mahathir‘s grand passion – the uplifting of the Malay community – has never 
distracted him from the need to preserve national stability. This accounts for the remarkable 
way in which he has won over the support of the Chinese community while still brandishing his 
colours as a Malay ultra. 
 
 In essence, he will do the deal with anyone, as long as he and his vision for the Malay 
community prevail. In this respect, his ability to surprise and confound should not be 
underestimated. In the past, he has welcomed bitter personal enemies such as Tengku Razaleigh, 
compromised with Chinese NGO Suqui, and even offered to relinquish bumiputera educational 
quotas for university entrance. As I said earlier, Dr Mahathir is a man with a mission. Back in 
the 1940s and 1950s, he identified the importance of overcoming Malay backwardness. From 
very early on, he was keenly aware of the humiliating position of the Malays, as mere tenants in 
their own land, beggars at the colonial feast. At the time, he singled out the community‘s 
predilection for superstition and the crippling impact of feudalism and fatalism. After half a 
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century of cajoling and criticizing, as well as the intervention of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP), there is no doubt that many of these challenges have been overcome. 
 
 Trumpeting the importance of education and knowledge, Dr Mahathir has been 
unflagging in his devotion to alleviating Malay poverty and ignorance. This is a consistent 
theme in all his work. His writings (beginning with his articles in the late 1940s when he first 
contributed commentaries under the pseudonym ‗Che Det‘), his speeches and his interviews 
have always focused on the Malays. 
 
 Nonetheless, in recent years, his implementation of the NEP has drawn considerable 
criticism. He has been attacked for the way he has emphasized bumiputera or Malay wealth 
accumulation at the expense of income inequality. 
 
 Many economists have argued, and justifiably, that he has devoted far too much of the 
nation‘s precious resources to trying to create a cadre of Malay entrepreneurs. As with all 
politicians of conviction, Dr Mahathir has scant concern for his critics. He has always sought to 
implement his vision regardless of the political consequences. However, at times, the fallout has 
been severe, if not devastating. 
 
 As a lawyer and a writer, I can confirm that the civil society agenda and all forms of 
participatory politics have been at the receiving end of his withering scorn, leaving the judiciary 
(until recently), the civil service and the media emasculated. 
 
 However, in recent years, Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) has presented a potent 
challenge to the modern Malay agenda, and the Prime Minister is all to aware of the 
opposition‘s strength within the community. It has become clear since the 1999 general election 
that the Malaysa are willing to make a radical volte-face. Angered by UMNO and its leaders, 
many in the community have turned their backs on the party. Moreover, UMNO has lost the 
moral high ground since the Anwar Ibrahim episode. 
 
 Lacking the moral authority of the past, both the party and Dr Mahathir are now facing 
a major intellectual threat that could lead to the nation‘s transformation. PAS wishes to 
dismantle what it considers to be UMNO‘s secular administration with an avowedly Islamic 
government. Dr Mahathir, for his part, sees the full-scale imposition of the Syariah and the 
dominant role of the ulama as a dead-end for the Malay community. 
 
 Clearly, his blueprint, Vision 2020, would not survive such as transition. By way of 
comparison, the political schism with Tengku Razaleigh‘s Semangat 46 in the late 1980s was 
personal. Today‘s rift is ideological. Given the disunity within the Malay community, the Prime 
Minister has launched his attack on PAS with is customary vigour and, as with former British 
prime minister Margaret Thatcher, age has not mellowed his rage and indignation. 
 
 Which brings me to my last point. 
 
 In order to protect and then ensure the survival of his legacy, and prevent PAS from 
winning power, Dr Mahathir may well end up having to do a deal. He will need to co-opt and 
win over figures from the opposition and bloster those within the administration who possess 
sufficient credibility in terms of Islam. 
 
 In many ways, he has already done this. 
 
 The position of Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi (the only senior Umno leader 
with impeccable Islamic credentials) as his anointed successor reveals Dr Mahathir‘s 




 Increasingly, his energies and UMNO‘s resources will be directed at tackling PAS‘s 
mounting strength. He will do whatever it takes to secure UMNO‘s future – his intensity and 
passion will ensure that – but his survival instincts will mean that compromise cannot be ruled 
out. 
 
 For Dr Mahathir the didactic ideologue, the challenges today are not dissimilar to those 
of 1969. He continues to see events through the prism of his own experiences. As far as he is 
concerned, the Malay community is in jeopardy and he must fight to save his beloved people 
from PAS, if not themselves. 
 
 For Malaysia and Malaysians, the questions are more complex and less succinct. When 
will he relinquish his hold over the nation? Will his passions cloud his judgment? Can the 
nation withstand another bout of Dr Mahathir‘s brinkmanship? Are his solutions still valid in 
the new millennium? Is it too late? Have the Malays already changed? 
 
 Finally, can Dr Mahathir heal the deep rift within the ummah or will he merely 
exacerbate the divide? 
 
 
THE SINGAPORE DILEMMA 
Business Times Singapore, March 23, 2002 
Sin Chew Jit Poh, March 31, 2002 
The Star, March 31, 2002 
 
 
Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relations are among the most ridiculous in the Asia-Pacific. 
Since I‘m neither a member of the People‘s Action Party nor the Barisan Nasional, I ignore the 
nonsense, get on with my own affairs, and leave the squabbling to the politicians. 
 
  However, there are three key themes in the relationship that people tend to 
forget. The first is the Malaysian-Malay sense of inferiority on the one hand, and the 
Singaporean-Chinese sense of insecurity on the other. The second is the Singaporean refusal to 
acknowledge the impact of ‗perception‘ in its diplomacy; although this is matched by a 
perceived Malaysian sleight-handedness when it comes to actual negotiations. The third is the 
growing cultural and linguistic divide between the city-state and Malaysia, not to mention the 
rest of the region. 
 
  While I‘ve been writing about Malaysia for over ten years, I‘ve not had the 
same opportunity to turn my attention to Singapore. I like to think I‘ve built up a fairly 
extensive knowledge of the island republic and several of its leading personalities. Certainly, 
there‘s a need in Singapore for alternative voices as it grapples with the changing face of 
economics and politics in the Asia-Pacific. Excluding bright and independent thinkers seems to 
be the highest art form in the city-state. Still, I‘ve grown quite fond of the place and that warmth 
infuses what I say because I‘m too aware of the island republic‘s charms, as well as its 
inconsistencies and flaws. 
 
  In fact, while I‘ve been in the United States on a Fulbright fellowship. I‘ve 
spent more time with Singaporeans than with Malaysians. I‘ve dined with former journalist 
Cherian George in Stanford, shared a panel at the World Economic Forum with United Nations 
Permanent Representative Kishore Mahbubani, discussed bilateral relations with Minister of 
Information and the Arts David Lim, and hung out with Ong Beng Seng‘s daughter, Melissa 
Ong, at Columbia University. Clearly, we share a lot more with one another than we care (or 
dare) to acknowledge. 
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  Pride is a major barrier to good bilateral relations. Many Malaysians and 
especially Malays have long felt a sense of gnawing inferiority when confronted with 
Singapore‘s dramatic economic achievements. Of course, most Malaysians – myself included – 
have often got to be reminded of the city-state‘s anxiety about its security, given its small size. 
Sadly, when these two forces collide, bilateral relations are inevitably derailed. These 
sentiments explode to the surface in intemperate and emotional outbursts. 
 
 To Malaysians, Singapore has always seemed extremely strong and prosperous. It was 
better organized, better managed and more efficient and so much richer. Just imagine the 
frustration. But this is no longer the case. The surprising success of the Port of Tanjung Pelapas 
(PTP) in Johor has startled Malaysians and turned PTP‘s owner, Syed Mokhtar, into a national 
hero. 
 
 His ability to compete head-on with one of Singapore‘s core competencies – its ports – 
has altered the terms of the engagement. Suddenly, Singapore does not look so invulnerable or 
so superior. If a former rice-trader can figure out a way of competing against Singaporeans and 
successfully, others can too. Malaysian have finally stumbled onto a winning formula that 
combines cheap and well-located infrastructure, and international capital and managerial 
expertise 
. 
 The second issue concerns perception. Singaporeans must learn to acknowledge that 
legalese and the language of diplomacy is swiftly knocked aside by public opinion. I know this 
is lamentable. Being trained in law, I should promote the efficacy of contracts and agreements. 
However, as President George W. Bush demonstrated recently in his handling of the U.S. steel 
industry‘s demands, political considerations often undermine the best intentions. 
 
 For example, while Singapore as a sovereign nation is fully entitled to strike whatever 
bilateral free trade agreements it wishes I‘ve personally found Singapore‘s pursuit of them as 
indicative of the city-state‘s lack of commitment to the region. 
 
 All states must identify their national interests and pursue those goals. Sometimes, 
however, the determined pursuit of those objectives can end up irritating and alienating the 
neighbours, especially if the aims are stated too bluntly. Technocrats are often the worst 
communicators and squander vital goodwill. 
 
 The third issue is the one that troubles me the most and makes me worry for 
Singapore‘s future. I have discerned in Singapore a deliberate de-emphasising of the region – in 
terms of language policies, culture and politics. 
 
 Try as it might, Singapore will never be a great global city like New York, London or 
Paris. Singapore is thoroughly provincial though not quite as provincial as Kuala Lumpur or 
Jakarta. However, the region‘s other capital cities enjoy the benefit of an extensive hinterland, 
providing a greater depth of cultural and political diversity. If you doubt my conclusion, read 
the city-state‘s newspapers and examine the cultural  concerns of the citizenry: the banality is 
astounding. But that doesn‘t mean that Singapore can‘t be an important regional centre. 
 
 A further complication is the fact that young Singaporeans don‘t seem to possess the 
same facility as their parents to meet and mix with fellow Southeast Asians. The fixation with 
the global agenda has made many Singaporeans lose sight of the imperatives of geography, 
turning their backs on the region. The hinterland is steadily being forgotten and, like a dream, 
it‘s beginning to drift away with the morning mist. For example, less and less Singaporeans can 
speak Malay – even pasar Malay eludes them. 
 
 I‘ve had to keep reminding my Singaporean friends that the nation is located in the 
heart of Southeast Asia. It‘s not floating off North America – it is neither Long Island nor 
Catalina Island. As it happens, many young Singaporeans who responded to the global agenda 
have packed their bags and moved on. During my lecture tour of the United States, I‘ve been 
 460 
amazed by the number of Singaporeans at top-notch Ivy League universities. However, only one 
or two showed a willingness to return home. 
 
 Having raised expectations, the government seems to have failed in providing the 
environment for these extraordinarily accomplished young people to live and work at home. 
Hell, I was reduced to trying to ‗sell‘ them the attractions of Singapore and I‘m a Malaysian. I 
did so because this is a challenge we all share in the region. 
 
 For a while, the Internet boom seemed to offer a fantastic prospect of ‗hooking up‘ with 
the world. The mirage has evaporated and geography has reasserted itself. Singapore‘s future 
lies in the region and with the region. 
 
 Does Singapore have enough Malay, Hindi, Thai, Vietnamese and Filipino speakers to 
capitalize on this? Has the government encouraged engagement with the region? Or has it, in 
pushing the global agenda, led the populace to forget the region as well as the city state‘s all-




PAK LAH – THE UNDERSESTIMATED MAN 
 
The Business Times Singapore, February 6, 2001 
 
The Straits Times, February 7, 2001 
 
The Jakarta Post, February 8, 2001 
 
The Sun, February 11, 2001 
 
 
Malaysia‘s Deputy Prime Minister Abdulla Ahmad Badawi defies political convention. In 
an age of ideologues, hypocrites and rabble-rousers, he is conciliatory, he is dull and he is a 
gentleman. Overlooked and ignored for much of his career, he now stands within a whisper of 
the premiership, prompting those who observe Malaysian politics to ponder how he would fare 
in the highest office. Is he merely a relic of a discredited age or is he a force for change? Can he 
heal the nation‘s still painful wounds? 
 
 With the Barisan Nasional government facing an unprecedented onslaught on four 
interlocking fronts – Islam, race relations, corporate governance and a range of civil society 
issues – I feel Pak Lah should be able to deal confidently with the first two areas. I suspect the 
third and fourth will present the greatest challenges. However, if he wants to ensure that UMNO 
does not share the same fate as Taiwan‘s Kuomintang or India‘s Congress, he will have to 
tackle the much needed economic and political reforms head-on. 
 
 One of his strongest assets is that he does not elicit hatred (or love) in the same measure 
as either Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad or Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, both of whom, by 
dint of their charismatic personalities and take-no-prisoners approach to politics, have acquired 
hundreds if not thousands of virulent, life-long enemies. This asset is reinforced by Pak Lah‘s 
continued loyalty to UMNO, the party, and not to any particular faction within the party: the 
distinction is fine but important. 
 
 As a consequence, angering many of the prime minister‘s enemies – he is both 
respectful and dutiful in his dealings with Mahathir. Unlike Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, he will 
not be mannoeuvring to replace his boss. Because of this and his own unwavering confidence in 
UMNO‘s ability to drive Malaysia‘s political and socio-economic reforms, many of his 
pronouncements may well seem anodyne. Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe how he has 
been tackling the four major challenges facing the UMNO-led administration 
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 The first, Islam, is one of Pak Lah‘s strengths. The deputy prime minister is the only 
member of the UMNO hierarchy who can articulate the party‘s modernist religious position. 
Pak Lah has demonstrated a surprising sense of moderation and progress when discussing Islam, 
advocates, in one speech last year, ―an Islam that is dynamic and modern … not one that is 
static, obscurantist, rigid and entrenched in literalism.‖ His espousal of contemporary ijtihad 
(interpretation) of the Koran sets him head-to-head with the ulama led PAS. Nonetheless, he 
enjoys a degree of credibility in the Islamic arena for three reasons: firstly, his background as an 
Islamic student; secondly, his impeccable family life; and thirdly, by dint of his grandfather, the 
late Sheikh Abdullah Fahim, a former mufti of Penang and a renowned Islamic scholar. 
 
 These factors have tempered the tone of opposition attacks. Certainly the taunts bear no 
comparison to those leveled against Dr Mahathir. For example, when Datuk Fadzil Noor, the 
leader of the opposition, accused the deputy minister – at the time of the encephalitis epidemic 
and attendant pig culling – of being little more than a pig herder, the insult backfired, drawing a 
barrage of angry criticism on the PAS leader. Interestingly, even Datuk Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the 
Mursyidul-Am, or spiritual leader of PAS, and Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Kelantan has 
conceded that Pak Lah, as the descendant of a notable cleric, shares certain characteristics with 
himself. 
 
 Secondly, the handling of racial issues. Pak Lah‘s religious background is matched by 
his roots in Penang‘s cosmopolitanism. In his speeches, he has stressed his multi-racial 
credentials. Many NGOs, despite their unhappiness with the government, had to concede that 
Pak is a man of his word. In this respect, his integrity at the negotiating table is unquestioned. 
Moreover, he has worked very hard to lower the political temperature surrounding Chinese 
community NGO Suqui‘s 87-point memorandum in late December, 2000. He rejected 
confrontation and insisted on the need for dialogue. This represents a refreshing change in 
UMNO‘s approach to race relations. Interestingly, he also enlisted a number of bright twenty-
something graduates to assist with the negotiations – showing himself ready and willing to 
embrace the younger generation, their ideas, their enthusiasm and their professionalism. 
 
 Similarly, the recent decision not to permit the Malay Action Front‘s demonstration in 
Kampung Baru underlines his rejection of incendiary race-based politics. As he said in a recent 
speech, ―Malay leaders must realize that communal rhetoric is outdated and does great damage 
to national unity.‖ 
 
 The third issue – transparency and cronyism – will, I suspect, be one of the most 
difficult for Pak Lah to address. Having never held a prominent economic portfolio in the past, 
his inexperience may work against him, especially if he allows others too much freedom in their 
management of the economy. However, there are those who argue (and quite persuasively) that 
having been ignored by the business community during most of his political career, he has not 
acquired a coterie of business associates. 
 
 The recent MAS share sale and the ongoing saga of Renong and UEM have highlighted 
once again the iniquities of the New Economic Policy (NEP), sparking off a firestorm of 
criticism. To his credit, Pak Lah has conceded the importance of rethinking the NEP. He has 
stressed the need to ensure that the redistribution of wealth and opportunities is more effective 
and efficient. But in tackling these issues he will be coming face-to-face with powerful, 
entrenched interests. 
 
 If he is serious in pursuing these objectives, Pak will need to protect his credibility. It 
goes without saying that all his dealings (and especially those of his family) with the corporate 
world have to be wholly transparent. Any backsliding on this front will – and very swiftly, as 
Indonesia‘s President Abdurrahman Wahid is discovering to his chagrin – destroy much of the 
goodwill Pak Lah currently enjoys. 
 
 Fourthly, the civil society arena. The formation of the National Human Rights 
Commission (SUHAKAM) and its growing credibility under Tan Sri Musa Hitam, as well as 
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certain judicial appointments show an improvement in the government‘s civil society position. 
However, in many ways Anwar Ibrahim‘s case remains the litmus test of the government‘s civil 
society agenda, and in the years ahead, Pak Lah will have to turn his attention to the knotty 
problem of his former rival. 
 
 But as Michael Vatikiotis, the managing editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review 
and a seasoned regional commentator, says of the courtly, if diffident politician: ―He is the 
epitome of the gentleman politician. He considers himself a dutiful public servant. Both 
qualities make for a softer approach to issues and a tendency to seek compromise rather than 
confrontation. Some consider this a wekness – they are qualities nonetheless.‖ 
 
 After two decades of extraordinary growth and traumatic socio-political change, 
Malaysia needs a period of reconciliation and consolidation. Maybe Pak Lah – the most 
underestimated man in Malaysian politics – will be able to heal the country‘s wounds and 
prepare the people for the future. 
 
 
LEE KUAN YEW VISITS MALAYSIA 
 
The Business Times Singapore, August 25, 2000 
 
The Sun, August 27, 2001 
 
The Straits Times, August 28, 2000 
 
 
How times change. Five years ago, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew‘s comments about Dr 
Mahathir‘s handling of the Anwar Ibrahim issue – or any form of criticism whatsoever – would 
have sparked off a diplomatic incident. 
 
 There would have been intemperate demonstrations at the Singapore High Commission, 
effigies burnt at the Causeway and threats to turn off the water supply. Within days, UMNO 
Youth‘s emotionalism would have been matched by a flurry of angry letter to The Straits Times 
and outraged statements from grassroots leaders in Geylang and Ang Mo Kio. 
 
 This time, the only sound is the baying of the international media, no doubt dismayed 
by an uncustomary display of equanimity on the part of the Malaysian political class. Have the 
two sides finally grown up? Has maturity and common sense triumphed? Well, yes and no.  
 
 I have three key points to make. The first is the emotional undercurrent to the 
undercurrent to the Senior Minister‘s trip. The second and third are intertwined and concern the 
two major changes in the Malaysian political landscape – the increasing role of conservative 
Islam and the weakening hold of the traditional elite on the political process. As these trends 
develop, bilateral relations will alter forever. 
 
 Certainly, Mr Lee‘s recent trip to Malaysia – a valedictory tour – was designed to be as 
non-confrontational as possible. His public lecture, for example, was deliberately anodyne. The 
Malaysian establishment turned out in force to show respect to a great postwar leader, and, to 
my surprise, fond regard as well. While he fluffed answers and ducked questions in a most 
unLKY-like fashion, the emotional connection was there for all to see and feel. 
 
 However, for confirmed cynics such as myself, his performance revealed the true nature 
of the visit: Build bonds, don‘t break them. Similarly, Dr Mahathir preferred to smooth over 
differences rather than accentuate them. 
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 After the debacle of the SingTel bid for Time dotcom, I detect in both men a realization 
that as the region continues to flounder, Singapore and Malaysia have to work together in order 
to survive. In short, outstanding issues must be resolved and deals concluded. 
 
 However, it is also important to stress once again the historical and emotional aspect of 
the trip. After ten long years, the Senior Minister has finally crossed the causeway, revisiting the 
scene of his greatest failure – Malaysia. The fact that he did drive across the brackish water that 
divides Singapore from Johor marks an enormous step forward both for him and the entire city-
state, because without his lead, the wound that is Separation will never be healed. 
 
 Arriving in Kuala Lumpur, I would imagine he must have been pleasantly surprised by 
the scale of the city‘s development. Notwithstanding the changes to the skyline, Kuala Lumpur 
remains at heart of ‗company town‘, an UMNO town, a place where the past is always present. 
 
 The upper ranks of UMNO are still peppered with names that are more redolent of 
history than current affairs. Meeting Datuk Seri Syed Hamid, son of Syed Jaafar Albar; Datuk 
Seri Najib, son of Tun Razak; and Datuk Hishammuddin, son of Tun Hussein Onn, it is all too 
easy to become seduced by the false allure of dynasty. The reality is very different, and while 
touching base with old friends is rewarding on a personal level, it would be unwise to take the 
familiarity and calm for granted. 
 
 The modern, progressive and multi-racial elite that have run Malaysia over the past four 
decades is facing its biggest challenge. The circle of power and influence has widened 
immeasurably, opening up competing sources of authority such as PAS-inclined ulama. 
 
 Judging from his comments at the open forum about the madrasah education system in 
Singapore. Mr Lee is well aware of the potential pitfalls that accompany the melding of politics, 
governance and religion. Umno, and the Barisan Nasional in particular, must grapple with the 
intricacies of the three and present a workable solution. However, the ideological battles that are 
being fought every day in ceramahs (lectures) up and down the peninsula will in time be 
resolved, and when that happens, the nation‘s attention will turn outwards. 
 
 Conservative Islam is here to stay. As a result, Singapore (as with Thailand and the 
Philippines with their sizeable Muslim populations) will not be spared in the long run. A 
wealthy and empowered theocracy will not necessarily respect the basic tenets of international 
relations and diplomacy. Issues of sovereignty will appear nugatory in the face of perceived 
injustice and mistreatment of a Muslim minority. How will the increasingly powerful ulama 
view Singapore? It is unlikely that Islamic chauvinism will be any easier to deal with than 
Malay chauvinism. Delivering in terms of political and socio-economic benefits is far easier 
than the spiritual and theological, and a nation as secular as Singapore will be faced with an 
enormous challenge in this respect. Unlike Indonesia where reform and renewal is inevitably 
accompanied by bloodshed and uproar change manifests itself very slowly in Malaysia. 
 
 For a start, Malaysia is becoming less and less a ‗top-down‘ society. The split in the 
Malay community is deep, challenging UMNO as it seeks to reinvent itself. An indication of 
this trend is the appointment of a political novice and UMNO Youth Executive Committee 
member, Mohd Khir Toyo, to the post of Menteri Besar of Selangor. 
 
 Making much of the ordinariness of the man‘s background, Utusan Malaysia even went 
so far as to call him budak sampah (garbage boy), in reference to the fact that he used to earn 
money by collecting old newspapers. 
 
 And it is this preoccupation with the internal dynamics of the Muslim Malaysia and the 
twin challenges of credibility and legitimacy – stemming from last year‘s election and the Sauk 
incident – that has resulted in UNO‘s domestic focus. In order to survive as the sole party of the 
Malays, Umno is battling for the community‘s soul. 
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 In this context, relations with Singapore are secondary. Moreover, part of the reason the 
senior Minister‘s comments did not elicit a firestorm of controversy is, quite simply, the fact 
that Umno‘s grip has receded. 
 
 Dealing with party luminaries in Kuala Lumpur or winning and dining with the party 
faithful will not give much of an idea of the sentiment on the ‗ground‘ as the ‗ground‘ has 
become more truculent, disbelieving and querulous. The top-down, quasi-feudal UMNO 
political machinery has spluttered to an untimely halt while the party members undergo a re-
engineering. The centre can no longer dictate reactions at the periphery. This is a sign of 
increasing democratization in Malaysia. However, greater freedom of action will in the end 
make the bilateral relations far more complicated and their management far less simple. So 
while Singapore and the Senior Minister can enjoy a respite in their relations with Malaysia, the 
future will demand a more complex and subtle engagement. 
 
 
AMERICA – THE LONE RANGER 
 
The Business Times Singapore, September 29, 2001 
 
The Sun, September 30, 2001 
 
Sin Chew Jit Poh, October 7, 2001 
 
 
Maybe, it‘s just me but I loathe hypocrisy and jingoism. Living in Malaysia has made 
brought me into regular contact with both and on a daily basis. My readers will know that I 
despise the Malaysian propensity for table-thumping. It depresses me when my countrymen and 
women are wrapping themselves up in national flags and singing patriotic songs rather than 
bothering to understand the unpleasant truths about our society, the injustice and corruption, the 
ignorance and bigotry. 
 
 However, in the aftermath of the awful events in New York late last year, I have been 
equally shocked by the hypocrisy and jingoism emanating from the United States, a country I 
have long admired. 
 
 I prefer to listen rather than to preach, and having just returned from London a few days 
ago, there are a few thoughts I‘d like to share with my readers about the American response to 
the barbaric and evil terrorists attacks in New York and Washington D.C. 
 
 Firstly, I have discovered (and this worries me) that Americans consider the loss of 
American lives on American soil to be of greater importance than, shall we say, Rwandan lives 
on Rwandan soil. Frankly, this is not unexpected. If 6,000 Malaysian were to be killed in an 
attack on the Twin Towers in Kuala Lumpur, you can bet your bottom dollar that Malaysian 
would be outraged, upset and distraught. Nothing else would matter in Kuala Lumpur. 
However, I have begun to realize that Americans also expect me – a non-American – to believe 
the same thing: to believe that one American life is worth more than one Rwandan, on 
Bangladeshi, one Chinese or one Macedonian. 
 
 In essence, an assault on America is an assault on humanity whereas a barbarous 
program in Rwanda leaving tens of thousands dead is merely a tragedy. I leave my readers to 
think it through. The word you are thinking of begins with the letter ‗h‘. 
 
 Another aspect of the same point is the fact that many Americans (not all, mind you) 
can‘t seem to comprehend that whilst we are shocked and appalled by the terrorist attack, we do 
not wish to be involved in the retaliation, nor do we support it unreservedly. Sympathy is one 
thing: revenge dressed up as justice is another. But our reservations are immediately seen as an 
indication of anti-Americanism and god forbid, anti-semiticism. 
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 As a lawyer, I believe that anyone, however heinous their alleged crime, deserves a 
legal hearing. The Nazis were tried for their war crimes as is former Serbian President, 
Slobodan Milosevic. 
 
 Retribution must follow the due process of the law. When we circumvent the law and 
proceed unilaterally (as judge, jury and prosecution rolled into one) we descend to the level of 
the uncivilized – we are no better in essence than those whom we accuse and then attack. 
Respect for the law in turn earns up respect. Needless to say this is a lesson that the Malaysian 
government often refuses to heed as well. However, I would expect better of the world‘s 
indispensable nation. 
 Secondly, there is a great deal more uncertainty in the North Atlantic Alliance than 
many would realize from listening to the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Despite the fact 
that Tony Blair‘s face is firmly buried in George W. Bush‘s fundament, many Brits (and these 
are not just Guardian-reading pacificists), whilst horrified by the terrorist assault, are dismayed 
by a number of things. 
 
 They are perplexed by the American refusal to acknowledge to acknowledge how their 
own past actions might have outraged the rest of the world. I watched an astounding piece of 
‗live‘ TV in the U.K. (BBC‘s Questin Time) where a studio audience tore apart a visibly 
distressed former American diplomat. The seething anger shocked me, if only because this was 
taking place in London and not Beijing or Baghdad. The audience that night (and these were 
British people, not Libyans or Cubans) asked questions about the American policy in the Middle 
East, about the Kyoto Protocol and the Nuclear Missile Defence. Bush‘s past attitude to foreign 
policy – ‗my way or the highway‘ – came under detailed scrutiny and attack. Similarly, 
America‘s flagrant bias towards Israel has alienated many in the Arab world for decades. The 
manifest refusal to confront this fact stuns me time and again. 
 
 The audience was also chary of the prospect of an intemperate and ill-considered 
American response to the assault and the possible impact on their lives. No one seemed keen to 
allow the Americans a blank cheque with regard to the military action. 
 
 A few years ago I remember being lectured by many Americans on the sanctity of the 
market. I was told, and in very high-minded moralizing terms, that the free-market should 
determine all price-levels and at all times. I thought we weren‘t supposed to meddle with the 
markets, to intervene in Wall Street and prop up ailing businesses? Obviously I wasn‘t listening 
closely enough because there is proviso to such advice, namely, that whenever American 
financial interests are at stake, such laws can be ignored. 
 
 I have long admired the Americans for their tolerance of diverse political and social 
views. The ability is a towering source of strength. Of course as a writer my opinions are 
skewered by my personal concerns: freedom of speech is not a Malaysian virtue, shall we say? 
 
 In the United States, however, freedom of speech is a hallmark of American democracy 
and is currently coming under assault in the so-called interests of national security and the need 
to bolster public sentiment. I am concerned by the growing clamour to curtail this freedom and 
the pressure that is now being put on journalists at the Voice of America to report positive news 
– positive to an official – American position – and not to report the Taliban viewpoint. I am not 
a fan of the Taliban or any form of Islamic extremism; nonetheless, I am deeply disappointed by 
the pressure to curb such reports. It strikes at the heart of America‘s fundamental liberties. 
 
 In conclusion, all I can say is that tragedy reveals an individual‘s true strengths and 
weaknesses. The same is true of nations and whilst I am deeply sorry for the atrocious violence 
perpetrated on American soil, I am becoming equally saddened by the irrational and foolish 
response it has provoked ina country that I have long admired. 
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THE CLASH OF LIBERAL AND LITERAL ISLAM 
 
The Star, May 5, 2002 
 
The Business Times Singapore, May 6, 2002 
 
South China Morning Post, May 6, 2002 
 
Jakarta Post, May 7, 2002 
 
Sin Chew Jit Poh, May 12, 2002 
 




Who will win over the hearts and minds of Indonesia‘s two hundred million Muslims? 
Certainly, the images of extremism and violence have monopolized the headlines. However, the 
struggle between two contrasting visions of Islam – ‗liberal‘ on the one hand and ‗literalist‘ on 
the other is on-going. Still, in Indonesia, te moderates are a force to be reckoned with. Unlike 
most other Muslim countries such as Pakistan and Egypt, moderate scholars, thinkers and 
political activists occupy key positions in Indonesia. 
 
 The internationally celebrated scholar, Nurcholish Majid, Azyurmardi Azra, Dean of 
the leading mainstream Indonesian seminary, and IAIN‘s (State Academy of Islamic Sciences) 
Syarif Hidayatullah, are among the leading moderates. The two men are known for their 
willingness to address the challenges of modernity, their tolerance of other faiths as well as their 
sensitivity to gender rights. There are also a number of young-generation figures – such as the 
irrepressible political commentator Rizal Mallarangeng and the academic Luthfi Assyaukanie. 
 
 On the other hand, there are ultra-conservative leaders such as Hidayat Nur Wahid of 
the Justice Party and the recently detained Ja‘afar Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihad. Both espouse a 
more radical agenda that calls for the wholesale imposition of the Syariah Law. 
 
 Certainly, there is no fondness between the two groups. Recently, the Laskar Jihad 
leader was quoted in the Indonesian newsweekly Gatra as saying ―the difference between us 
and them (the liberals) is the same as between the followers of Islam and non-believers‖. 
However, the moderates are not running scared. Whilst the majority of Indonesians are middle-
of-the-road in terms of religious practices, the republic‘s liberals have in fact achieved a critical 
mass. 
 
 As the world‘s most populous Muslim nation and Southeast Asia‘s silent giant, 
Indonesia‘s fate will inevitably impact on the rest of the region. The vision of a radicalized 
ummah stretching from Acheh in the northwest to Irian Jaya in the east, straddling sensitive 
shipping lanes and controlling vital natural resources, scares many western strategists. 
 
 Part of the reason is that under Suharto‘s New Order regime, the religious establishment 
– both the NU and Muhammadiyah, steered clear of government. The NU with its roots in the 
privately owned pesantrens (religious schools) of East Java such as Tebuireng, Tambakberas 
and Denanyar has had a long history of autonomy. This feistiness stretches back to the days of 
Dutch colonialism. Conversely, the loose-knit structure has, at times undermined the 
effectiveness of the NU. The arm‘s length relationship has meant that both organizations with 
an estimated membership of thirty million members apiece have managed to retain their 
credibility in the eyes of the people. 
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 The NU also directed a great deal of their energies towards education. Unencumbered 
by political amibition, NU‘s kiyai (scholars) such as Abdurrahim Wahid (or Gus Dur) focused 
on the pursuit of knowledge. They spent time trying balance western enlightenment ideas with 
traditional Islamic precepts. Having been on the receiving end of the Suharto government, the 
NU developed a passionate and enduring commitment to human rights. 
 
 As Sharon Siddique, a leading regional sociologist, says of the thirty million strong 
association: ―whilst the NU is committed to tradition, it has demonstrated a surprising readiness 
to embrace new ideas.‖ Some would also add that this is due in part to the feudal but benign 
leadership in Gus Dur. 
 
 In this respect, Indonesia is extremely unusual. Elsewhere in the Islamic world, the 
religious establishment has often sacrificed its independence in working hand-in-glove with the 
authorities. At the same time, liberally-inclined writers and thinkers are generally embattled and 
isolated. In Egypt, for example, Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz was even the subject of a 
brutal assassination attempt in 1994. 
 
 Indonesia‘s liberals are not going to be victims. They are mobilizing. They think 
strategically. They understand the media and they plan for the future. A good example is the 
work being conducted by the Jaringan Islam Liberal – the Islamic Liberal Network. The group 
has focused on shaping public opinion. They appear on TV and radio shows, they write very 
regularly and syndicate their commentaries in newspapers across the archipelago. 
 
 The country‘s liberals are not effete, western-educated secularlists. Most of them have 
emerged from pesantrens. They are fluent in Arabic and trained in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). 
Their background gives them the confidence to debate substantive religious issues. They do not 
retreat from confrontation. As Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, the NU‘s head of human resource 
development, says: ―We come from within the tradition. We can challenge the conservatives 
head-on.‖ 
 
 Exposed to a wide range of classical works by many different Islamic scholars, 
including all the great legal traditions (the Maliki, the Hanbali, the Hanafi and of course, the 
Shafi’i), most of the students have developed an innate understanding of the ―internal 
dissension‘ and dialogue that lies at the heart of Islamic jurisprudence. In short, they realise that 
there is no ‗one‘ answer for any given question. 
 
 Their scholarship is prodigious and detailed. As deeply committed Muslims, they 
approach the Holy Koran with enormous respect, intense peity and intellectual rigour. Some 
have combined their profound knowledge of the Holy Koran and the Sunnah with a stint in 
leading western universities such as Canada‘s McGill and the Netherlands‘ Leiden. Newly-
learned philosophies and techniques such as hermeneutics and semantics are then employed in 
their research. 
 
 Moreover, they‘ve grasped a fundamental truth – that Islam is a religion that 
emphasizes both iman (correct belief) and amal (correct action). To their mind, reform 
movements cannot merely tinker around with policies and procedures. Instead, the core 
challenge is nothing less than a revisitation of the meaning and the application of Holy Koran. 
 
 Furthermore, they believe that modernity – human rights, democracy, science and 
technology – can be reconciled with Islam and that the two are not opposing forces. As Ulil 
explains, ―In exploring these values, we are drawn to the spirit of criticism and questioning that 
is a hallmark of centuries of Islamic discourse.‖ 
 
 A recent example is Wajah Baru Relasi Suami Isteri (The New Face of Husband/Wife 
Relations) – a re-examination of a respected kitab kuning (religious text) from the 1800s. 
Composed by Sheikh Nawawi, the text has become a stalwart teaching material in pesantrens 
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across the archipelago. However, for many progressives it represents some of the most 
misogynistic attitudes. 
 
 A study group led by Ibu Sinta Nuriah, the wife of former President Abdurrahman 
Wahid, set out to reappraise the book and redress the in-built gender bias of the original. The 
reinterpretation of nineteenth-century text is tackled diligently, line-by-line. Each and every 
hadis cited in the original is scrutinized and verified according to long-established rules of 
exegesis and authentication. Nasaruddin Umar, a Professor at IAIN, argues, ―Sheikh Nawawi‘s 
book is very Arabic in culture. This needs to be addressed along with the discrimination of 
women in the original. One must never forget that the ultimate goal of the Syariah is always 
Justice and Peace.‖ 
 
 Whilst the struggle between the forces will be prolonged, there is no doubt that in 









Moderate Muslim Must Speak Up! 
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Pak Lah — the Underestimated Man 
 
 































Abdullah Fahim )，即是槟城的伊斯兰法典诠释者，也是一位德高望重的伊斯兰学者。 
 
 这些要素缓和了反对阵线的攻击。这些当然和辱骂马哈迪医生的声浪是不能相提并
论的。比如，当日本脑炎肆虐的时候，反对党领袖拿督法兹诺( Datuk Fadzil Noor )指控副首
相和猪农没什么两样。这样的羞辱引发了一连串对回教党领袖的愤怒指控。有意思的是，就
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往事。在那里就有赛嘉化阿巴（Syed Jaafar Albar）的儿子拿督斯里塞哈密（Datuk Seri Syed 
Hamid）、敦拉萨（Tun Razak）的儿子拿督斯里纳吉（Datuk Seri Najib）、以及敦胡先翁
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